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CONTINGENCY AND NECESSITY: HUMAN AGENCY
IN MUSIL’S THE MAN WITHOUT QUALITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
It has often been seen as a crucial feature of modernity that the old
chains of necessity—religious, political, social, or otherwise—have been
shaken off and human beings have been released into a radical form of
freedom. This kind of freedom has both a positive and a negative side: on
the one hand, it may seem to allow us to make a kind of individual deci-
sion and to act according to our own will. On the other hand, it also brings
with it the dire difﬁculty of dealing with what we can call the problem of
contingency: how to decide what to do if it is equally open to us to
perform a certain action as well as its opposite, if there is no necessity, no
sufﬁcient reason that tells us to do the one but not the other? In this paper,
I argue that this problem of contingency has a prominent place in Robert
Musil’s The Man Without Qualities. I do not claim that Musil’s novel sug-
gests any deﬁnite answers, but rather that it presents and explores different
strategies for dealing with contingency.
Given the limits of this paper, I will not be able to give an exhaustive
account of this problem in Musil’s novel; a lot of the important ethical
implications will have to be left out, as, for example, the relation of this
problem to any form of violence. The paper will start by clarifying the
notion of contingency as it is taken up in the novel and its connection to
what Musil calls the sense of possibility. Subsequently, I will show how
Kakania, the “servants” and citizens of this state, deal with contingency.
The Parallel Campaign will be argued to be one big attempt to ground this
state in some kind of necessity. We will then move on to Ulrich’s way of
dealing with contingency: with Ulrich, Musil introduces the thought
experiment of assuming a person who is fully aware of the challenges that
contingency raises for human agency and who attempts to face up to
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them. Finally, I will contrast Ulrich’s way of dealing with contingency
with the way of some of the other characters in the novel.
II. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS:
CONTINGENCY AND THE SENSE OF POSSIBILITY
Let me ﬁrst clarify the notion of contingency at work in this paper
somewhat further, which will help us in our analysis of the different con-
tingent phenomena sketched in the novel. I want to understand
contingency here as the opposite of necessity1—so as a ﬁrst pass we can
understand it positively with the help of notions like chance, indetermi-
nacy, or possibility.
In The Man Without Qualities, necessity can be found in three dif-
ferent spheres:2 there is (1) logical necessity—Ulrich’s ideas for new ways
of living our lives are based on his attempts to follow only logical neces-
sity; (2) causal necessity—referred to in the discussions of the laws of
nature;3 and, most importantly for the great majority of citizens, (3) neces-
sity within the sphere of politics or society. The rules and regularities of
society are explicitly understood as a form of necessity by certain ﬁgures
of this novel; for example, Bonadea considers the changes of fashion as
following a form of necessity,4 and initially the regulations of the military
have the same status for Stumm von Bordwehr.
This last form of necessity—political or social—is put into doubt by
what Musil calls the “sense of possibility,” which takes this alleged neces-
sity as just one possibility among others. We get a famous account of this
sense right at the start of the book. Chapter 4, entitled “If there is a sense
of reality, there must also be a sense of possibility,” introduces the sense
of possibility in the second paragraph:
Whoever has it does not say, for instance: Here this or that has happened, will
happen, must happen; but he invents: Here this or that might, could, or ought
to happen. If he is told that something is the way it is, he will think: Well, it
could probably just as well be otherwise. So the sense of possibility could be
deﬁned outright as the ability to conceive of everything there might be just
as well, and to attach no more importance to what is than to what is not. The
consequences of so creative a disposition can be remarkable, and may,
regrettably, often make what people admire seem wrong, and what is taboo
permissible, or, also, make both a matter of indifference. Such possibilists are
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said to inhabit a more delicate medium [Gespinst], a hazy medium of mist,
fantasy, daydreams, and the subjunctive mood. Children who show this ten-
dency are dealt with ﬁrmly and warned that such persons are cranks,
dreamers, weaklings, know-it-alls, or troublemakers.
Such fools are also called idealists by those who wish to praise them.
But all this clearly applies only to their weak subspecies, those who cannot
comprehend reality or who, in their melancholic condition, avoid it. These
are people in whom the lack of a sense of reality is a real deﬁciency. But the
possible includes not only the fantasies of people with weak nerves, but also
the as yet unawakened intentions of God. A possible experience or truth is
not the same as an actual experience or truth minus its “reality value” but
has—according to its partisans, at least—something quite divine about it, a
ﬁre, a soaring, a readiness to build and a conscious utopianism that does not
shrink from reality but sees it as a project, something yet to be invented. […]
But such a man is far from being a simple proposition. Since his ideas,
to the extent that they are not idle fantasies, are nothing but realities yet
unborn, he, too, naturally has a sense of reality; but it is a sense of possible
reality, and arrives at its goal much more slowly than most people’s sense of
their real possibilities. He wants the forest, as it were, and the others the
trees, and forest is hard to deﬁne, while trees represent so many cords of
wood of a deﬁnable quality.5
The sense of possibility is introduced ﬁrst as a certain distance from
reality: it allows a person who possesses it to understand that the fact that
one thing happens does not imply that it happens with necessity, either
metaphysical or epistemic. Rather, it is possible that something else might
happen. This focus on what is possible can be a real deﬁcit, if it is indeed
a mere escape from reality. But it may equally well be a deliberate step of
gaining some distance from reality, if reality is itself understood as “a
project, something yet to be invented.” Such a positive sense of possibil-
ity may in turn be understood in two ways: it can be a sense of the
possibilities which are inherent, if undeveloped, in what is real; on the
other hand it can be a sense that reality as a whole could perfectly well be
different. The ﬁrst conception of possibility captures what has been estab-
lished in philosophical discourse, at least since Aristotle, as potentiality:
such potentialities are dependent on what there is, on what is actual.
People focusing on them have a sense for “real possibilities.” By contrast,
the second conception applies to people with a sense of possible realities,
who toy with completely new kinds of reality, in which previously
unthought possibilities may have a place. This is the sense of possibility
in its genuine sense, which the man without qualities possesses.
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The man with a sense of the real possibilities relies on a ﬁxed system
of given possibilities and can thus care for the individual trees. The man
with a sense of the possible realities, on the other hand, without any given
ﬁxed system, searches for the forest; he has an eye for the whole. But in
order to think about creating completely new realities, what is now seen
as real in society must be understood as what could equally well not be
real, as contingent. So the true sense of possibility, the sense of possible
realties, has to understand what is happening in the world as contingent,
which, by contrast, is not required of the sense of real possibility.
Let us now look at the notion of contingency itself. Musil employs
different notions of contingency, depending on whether we are dealing
with an individual event, or the interconnection of different events. If we
look at an individual event, not only is what happens contingent—it could
equally well not have happened—but so also is the way in which it
happens.6 However, several of these individual events that are contingent
in themselves could still, taken together as a series, follow some regular-
ity and thus show some predictability—the regularity of probability,
which can be expressed in the form of statistics. Right at the very begin-
ning of the book, in the ﬁrst chapter, some statistics about the numbers of
car accidents are introduced in order to calm down the lady witnessing a
car accident: while it is not necessary that this car accident, then and there,
needed to happen, such and such a number of accidents “have to happen”
according to the statistics. Thus the individual, contingent event is inte-
grated into the regularity of yearly statistics and seems to acquire some
form of “necessity.” This form of necessity, which is not fully graspable
by the individual citizen but reﬂected in some piece of statistics, is a con-
stant theme of the book.7
However, even if some connections of events seem to show some
regularity, on a yet more general level (as is the level of a political system
of a state) the connection of different statistically regular series of events
may nevertheless be contingent. Musil is not so much interested in the
question whether a system as a whole is indeed metaphysically contingent
per se—though for the most important example of the novel, the state
Kakania, we are not given any reason to assume an underlying metaphys-
ical necessity—as in whether it is perceived as metaphysically contingent,
which is what affects human agency. For example, a state as a whole can
be perceived as contingent thanks to its being excessively complex, as we
will see when dealing with Kakania below.
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Finally, we ﬁnd a form of contingency when we look at the role indi-
vidual human beings play within an economic, political, or social system:
while the fulﬁllment of a certain function within a system may be necessary,
in many cases the individual person fulﬁlling this task can be arbitrarily
exchanged.8
Contingency has often (but not always) been seen as the basis for the
freedom required for actions: according to this position, human beings can
only be free agents if not everything takes place necessarily, but at least
some things are contingent. This is the positive side of contingency.
However, understanding oneself as living in a world of mere contingen-
cies, where everything, or most things, that take place could equally well
not take place, or take place in a different way, seems to leave human
agents without much orientation for how to act: if everything we do could
equally well not be done or done in a different way, how are we to decide
what to do? This feeling of contingency is hard to cope with, and it either
prevents normal agency—it leads to the inability of or impediment to normal
agency—or it is unconsciously compensated by creating new forms of
necessity according to which we act.
In the following, we will focus on Musil’s discussion of how we
human beings can act in face of a contingent world. We will not develop
the notion of consistency at work in the novel any further, but rather con-
centrate on the practical question of how contingency is dealt with by the
characters in the novel.
III. DEALING WITH CONTINGENCY
Let us move on to analyze some of the strategies for dealing with the
problem of contingency that Musil discusses with the help of different
characters of his novel. On a general level we can say that most of the
ﬁgures we encounter try to deal with the contingency they experience by
constructing some necessary connections either vertically or horizontally.
In talking of vertical connections I have in mind that individual events or
rules are tied to one underlying principle.9 Horizontal connections, by
contrast, are a matter of individual events being connected with each other
in such a way that their connection now seems necessary.
The people in the novel—with the crucial exception of Ulrich—are
not aware that reality itself does not come well furnished with necessity,
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but rather that it is they themselves who establish such seemingly neces-
sary connections. These constructions are meant to help them orient
themselves in a reality that has become excessively complex. They allow
their creators to feel embedded in a meaningful order—an order that
seems comprehensible and gives its creator the feeling of having a place
in a clearly structured world.
As in Plato’s Republic, Musil shows the effects of the topic investi-
gated—here the problem of contingency—for a whole state as well as for
an individual soul, in order to see its inﬂuence on human agency. But in
contrast to Plato’s Republic, we will not see a parallel in each case. Rather,
the most important individual soul Musil discusses, Ulrich, is perceived
by his surrounding as attempting to destroy the systems of order that the
state has set up by questioning their very basis. I will ﬁrst look at how the
people of Kakania deal with contingency before I move on to Ulrich.
1. Kakania’s Muddling Through
Kakania is a paradigmatic example of how a political system that has
become too complex to be understood can ﬁnally appear as contingent. If
the degree of complexity is too high, people from their concrete epistemic
point of view cannot understand how the system is set up nor how it
works, and accordingly its very existence as well as the way it works can
seem contingent (and there is no reason to assume that there is some
underlying metaphysical necessity that is simply hidden). Kakania is such
an excessively complex political system, which is in no way understand-
able for the individual citizens, even though it pervades all their doings.
In order to let this incomprehensibility not destabilize their agency, most
citizens simply take the activities of this state as nonexistent. If, through
some accident, one is confronted with the incomprehensible connections
and doings that form the state of Kakania—as Ulrich is when he defends
a drunken worker and suddenly ﬁnds himself in the hands of the police—
panic seems the most natural reaction. While individual citizens understand
parts of the whole state system of Kakania—as, for example, Tuzzi under-
stands the subsystem of diplomacy—they are as helpless as their fellow
citizens when it comes to other parts of the system. And it is not clear how
the different subsystems are connected.
To its citizens the incomprehensible system of Kakania attempts to
seem necessary in its existence as well as in its workings. Any appearance
of arbitrariness has to be avoided as it could support the breaking apart of
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this state in line with the different nationalities that compose it (they claim
a form of necessity for their existence which a state composed of people
of many different nationalities would not ordinarily provide). Accord-
ingly, once Ulrich has been arrested by the police, he cannot simply be
released again with an acknowledgement that his arrest has been a
mistake, as this would mean that the arrest has been an arbitrary act. It is
only Ulrich’s relationship to the inﬂuential Count Leinsdorf which allows
the police to let him go, since this relationship can be interpreted as a dif-
ferent and higher form of (social) necessity.
Within Kakania, cases where it seems unclear how to deal with them
are not simply decided according to one’s best conscience—one cannot
permit that element of arbitrariness. Rather, these cases are sent up to the
next higher ofﬁcial or authority. The idea is that a seemingly exceptional
case that deﬁes the order of the state system will thereby become inte-
grated into this very order—either because the next higher authority has
more power (not necessarily more insight), or because something happens
on the way to this higher authority that determines what to do with this
case (a second instance of chance can eliminate the ﬁrst instance and thus
protect the system from any arbitrariness and contingency).
In spite of these efforts, the novel presents the citizens of Kakania as
having lost their belief in the necessary existence and working of their
state. And the emperor has lost his ability to serve as a unifying principle
for the different nations. It is no coincidence that in this state, which is full
of contradictions and confusing national problems, questions of identity
arise as pressing problems—something which is mirrored in Ulrich’s pro-
claimed lack of qualities. Nationalism seems to be one answer to these
questions,10 as it seems to offer a new, unconditional feeling of commu-
nity and orientation,11 and the idea of a nation seems to give each individual
some form of necessary identity. Within Kakania such nationalisms have
the effect that everything is done only provisionally, since the continuous
duty of balancing the demands of all the different nationalities prevents
the ruling powers from taking any real decision.12 In this permanent pro-
visional state there is neither a uniﬁed people of Kakania—something that
Count Leinsdorf attempts to create—nor are there nation states as the indi-
vidual nationalities envision it. All that is thus left is to muddle through,
Fortwursteln. While the system of Kakania, in its failed attempt to give
the impression of being necessary, is kept going by the civil servants,13 the
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citizens are left with the vague feeling that the system as a whole may be
as contingent as their position in it.
What is missing is a principle that might allow for integrating the dif-
ferent subsystems as well as all its citizens, something that could bestow on
their complex relationships a “natural” and thus noncontingent meaning—
and this is what the initiators of the Parallel Campaign are looking for.
2. The Parallel Campaign
The Parallel Campaign is meant to justify the state of Kakania in the
symbolic form of the emperor. The participants of the Parallel Campaign
are trying to ﬁnd some kind of basis for the state that would demonstrate
its existence to be necessary, some perceived metaphysical necessity.
This campaign comes into existence thanks to the news that Prussia
is going to have a big festival in 1918 to celebrate the thirty-year jubilee
of its emperor. If the always distrustfully regarded big brother wants to
show its might, then Austria, whose emperor will be able to celebrate
many more years of being on the throne in 1918, will have to react to this
(and hence a parallel campaign is set up). A great idea, of importance for
the whole world, needs to be found in order that Austria can ﬁnd its own
true self again. However, this great idea that is meant to justify the exis-
tence of Kakania, turns out to be very hard to ﬁnd—in spite of a plurality
of committees, meetings, and receptions.
From the very beginning it is clear to Diotima that this unifying and
grounding principle is the human spirit (der Geist), and since human spirit
has its origin obviously in Austria, the existence of Austria is credited with
some necessity; Austria can be seen as “a model for the nations of the
world” (chapter 57, 246). However, the slow-witted ones would like this
principle to be more concrete—they would like to have the concept of
spirit to be “ﬂeshed out with a particular content”—and thus the partici-
pants of the Parallel Campaign are looking for a content of that kind, a
concrete idea that makes the connection between human spirit and
Austria, and thus the idea of a Global Austria obvious.14 But, a time of
great ideas does not seem to lend itself to admitting a greatest one, and
there seems not even to be an “orderly” connection between the great
ideas—so Diotima assembles the most important thinkers and writers in
her salon in order to ﬁnd a system connecting these different ideas and to
determine the greatest among them.
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The ﬁerce search for such an idea changes gradually into frustra-
tion—until Count Leinsdorf ﬁnally announces the slogan “Action.” This
empty slogan—which allegedly transforms into practical action the intel-
lectual attempts that so far have been entirely without success—at ﬁrst seems
to satisfy. Although nobody knows what kinds of actions are meant and
which aims they are supposed to support, the slogan manages to stir up
new enthusiasm for the Parallel Campaign. However, the only action that
is performed at Diotima’s second big reception is performed by people
who in fact do not belong to the Parallel Campaign.
Finally, in the last few chapters the Parallel Campaign does ﬁnd an
aim—even if ﬁnding this aim happens as a matter of chance, rather than
as a matter of the hard thinking of its members: the world peace confer-
ence, which had already been mentioned as a possible aim at the beginning
of the campaign. Hence, the principle that is meant to justify the existence
of Kakania and thus to give it some necessity owes its own existence to
chance; it thus undermines itself.
3. How Ulrich Deals with Contingency
Ulrich is introduced as the only ﬁgure in the novel who is fully aware
of the contingency of our actions and conditions, as well as of the possi-
bilities and the problems that it implies for us as agents. Ulrich understands
that the contingency of the construction of our world allows us to have the
freedom not to be bound by any human situation; but at the same time it also
means “never knowing what one wants to be bound by” (chapter 63, 285).
He even sees the relationship we have to ourselves, to our own char-
acteristics and qualities, as contingent. Accordingly, he understands himself
as a man without qualities. While other ﬁgures in the novel attempt to ﬁnd
some sufﬁcient reason or necessity for what they do, Ulrich is the only
person who is happy to undermine the very principle of sufﬁcient reason
according to which the others work—by understanding it as the principle
of insufﬁcient reason: it seems this is what we in fact go by in this arbi-
trary world.
Against the reality of the society in which he lives, Ulrich perma-
nently comes up with other possible realities. He doubts the necessity of
the whole way in which society is set up—the necessity of individual sub-
systems, as, for instance, the conventional system of moral values,15 as
well as the social system as a whole.
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Understanding himself as not bound, but rather free from the norms
of his time and society, he attempts to give himself his own rules—he tries
to determine what he is free to do. The rules he attempts to establish are
not derived from any nature or essence—as the possibilities inherent in
what is real would be perceived by somebody who has a sense for real
possibilities. Rather, these rules are meant to be completely freely created,
as a new possible reality.
The only necessity Ulrich acknowledges is logical necessity: the
necessity that connects a thought and its implications. While Diotima
wants necessity to be tied to a certain content (to a certain truth about the
soul, for example), for Ulrich necessity is reduced to the mere formal
system of inferences. He rejects general duties within society, as he does
not think they possess any necessity. If he lives according to the general
accepted norms of morality nevertheless, this is because he cannot ﬁnd a
way of consistently realizing his ideas about other possible realities.
Ulrich’s attempts to live by self-given norms fail continuously, as can
be seen, for example, with his considerations of how to furnish his house
in chapter 5. These attempts fail, because by trying to integrate as many
aspects of reality as possible into his set of rules, reality becomes too
complex to handle: Ulrich begins by trying to take into account reﬂections
of architects, reformers, and art journals on how to live, feeling that he can
chose any style from the Assyrians to cubism, and starting to build his
own furniture, which just opens up even more possibilities, but he ﬁnally
leaves the furnishing of his house simply to his suppliers.16
An oversupply of possibilities is also what Ulrich faces on a more
basic level—with respect to his own qualities. He has the disposition to
display a variety of qualities, drawing, so to speak, from a pool of many
different ones. Actualizing one or another of these qualities seems to be
arbitrary, as if independent of him. What is speciﬁc for Ulrich is only his
disposition to have such an impersonal relationship to his own qualities.
And the qualities he displays in a certain situation are not necessarily
compatible with the qualities he shows in other situations: Ulrich experi-
ences himself variously as tall and broad-shouldered, like a sailing ship,
or as slender and soft, like a jellyﬁsh;17 in his eyes there are no features
that stay the same throughout to characterize him.
As these qualities are all equally close to (or distant from) him, he
has to choose from them contingently. Accordingly, he does not feel any
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personal connection to his qualities, but rather looks at them as he might
look at any possible qualities that human beings might have; they are “no
more intimately bound up with him than with anyone else who also
happen[s] to possess them” (chapter 39, 157). Thus the phenomenon of
alienation prevalent in modernity is transferred to Ulrich’s relation to
himself, and accordingly he often seems a stranger to himself.
Furthermore, the vast number of qualities he has at his disposal
opens up too many possibilities for Ulrich to be able to give his life any
clear shape. Most of the time he simply drifts or takes his life as an exper-
iment that is not particularly serious. Sometimes this results in an
inhibition or inability to act; at other times he just falls back into conven-
tional behaviour—as, for instance, when Agathe forges the testament of
their father and he reproaches her by the standards of conventional moral
norms in which he himself does not believe. Thus, Ulrich “leads the life
of another man” (chapter 40, 169); his thinking and his acting often con-
tradict each other. Alternatively, he simply jumps to an action without this
being based on any reﬂection and thus without it having any real reason.
In these situations it is not particularly important which action he per-
forms, but only that he performs some action or other.18
Ulrich’s awareness of the contingency of our existence and actions
grants him, as a positive effect, freedom from conventional expectations
of society. However, Ulrich also has to compensate for this, otherwise par-
alyzing, awareness in order to be able to go on living, to make decisions,
and to act with reasons. We see Ulrich display three different ways of
dealing with contingency, all of which involve establishing some neces-
sary connections:
(1) While Ulrich doubts any necessary connection between the qual-
ities a person possesses and the person possessing them, he recognizes
that there can be some necessity in the way these qualities are connected
with each other. Thus while Ulrich dissolves necessary vertical connec-
tions—a grounding in a more fundamental principle, as accidents might
be grounded in a substantial essence—he accepts the possibility of a nec-
essary horizontal connection: “he was able to say of his life that everything
in it had fulﬁlled itself as if it belonged together more than it belonged to
him” (chapter 39).
(2) Ulrich grounds his own actions in some indeterminate higher
aim: he feels “on the way” (even if he is not clear which way this might
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be and where it might lead) and as “a tool for an important aim” (even if
it is unclear which aim this might be; chapter 40). Considering himself
thus specially selected, Ulrich can feel integrated into a meaningful
framework and whole that grants some security. However, while Ulrich
wants to ground his actions in an aim, a telos, he leaves this telos com-
pletely undetermined. We will see below that grounding one’s action in a
telos is the most common method of establishing necessity among the
other characters of the novel. But in contrast to Ulrich, the other charac-
ters try to determine the higher principle which grounds their actions and
they also see the whole order of society as in some way connected with
some such principle, some alleged eternal truth.
(3) Ulrich establishes some necessity on a general level, even if it is
arbitrary which individual fulﬁls a certain function within this general
structure. An example where this way of dealing with contingency
becomes especially clear is Ulrich’s relationships to his girlfriends:19 his
relation to his mistresses in the ﬁrst book is merely determined by acci-
dents; there is no necessity in his love for an individual human being
—nothing, which could be understood as fate or some purpose for life. In
order not to be continuously faced with contingency, Ulrich integrates his
mistresses into different general systems; he understands them as instances
of more general ideas.
The ﬁrst woman we see at Ulrich’s side in the novel is Leontine, a
chanteuse in a cabaret, tall, curvaceously slender, voracious. “Once a man
has put his house in order it is time to go courting. Ulrich’s girlfriend in
those days was a chanteuse in a small cabaret who went by the name of
Leontine”—that’s how the sixth chapter of the novel, which deals with
Leontine, starts. It seems as if Ulrich simply follows the convention that
after having acquired a house one goes courting, without actually falling
in love with some particular woman. We learn that he has been struck by
Leontine’s eyes, her regular face, and her songs full of feeling, but she is
not of interest to Ulrich as the individual person she is. Rather, she
reminds him immediately “of old photographs or engravings of dated
beauties.” He groups her with those beauties that are not the period’s taste,
renames her, and now “desires to possess her, as he might have wanted to
possess a luxurious lion-skin rug” (chapter 6, 17).
How Ulrich and Leontine separate we do not know. She is an episode
in his life, replaced simply by another: in the next chapter Bonadea, who
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accidentally enters his life, becomes his new mistress. Both women, Leontine
and Bonadea, have become part of Ulrich’s life due to arbitrary circum-
stances.20 For Ulrich, the individual persons are interchangeable; it is only
in their function as his mistress that they have any importance for him. In
both cases we ﬁnd two kinds of strategies in order to deal with the contin-
gency at work: he renames them and connects them to ancient goddesses.
In the case of Leontine the renaming follows her own name, and just
makes the animal contained in the name (Leona) more obvious, whereas
with Bonadea there does not seem to be a fundamentum in nomine, and
indeed we never actually learn her real name. Both mistresses are con-
nected with ancient goddesses:21 Leontina is compared to Juno, the voracious
chanteuse to the grand goddess of women and marriage. Of the second
mistress, we only learn her “divine name”: Bonadea, the good goddess,
for whom chastity and sexual excess are closely related. This act of
renaming and connecting them with ancient goddesses raises his girl-
friends to a more general level, while their individuality loses its importance.
In stark contrast to the contingency of his relationships to women in
the ﬁrst book is Ulrich’s relationship to his sister in the second book. With
her he has found a person who is a real soul-mate, a kindred spirit,22 so
that his relationship to her seems to be grounded in some necessity; and
this necessity is not merely biological (in that he is her brother). It is pre-
cisely a relationship that society dismisses as impossible, a love
relationship between siblings, that bestows some necessity on his life.
Living together with Agathe allows Ulrich for the ﬁrst time to live one of
his so far only theoretical ideas, and a possible reality seems to become a
real possibility.
4. How Other Selected Figures Deal with Contingency
Ulrich’s way of dealing with contingency is contrasted with and
complemented by those of some of the other main characters in the novel.
Bonadea and Arnheim, for instance, are examples of people who have set
up their life in a way that decidedly attempts to avoid any disturbances
stemming from contingency. Bonadea avoids becoming aware of any
problem of contingency by having her life structured according to a clear
duality: on the one hand there is her family, and a certain bourgeois ideal
of life grounding this domain. Her beloved two sons and her much dis-
liked husband are the ﬁxed personages of this sphere. On the other hand,
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there is her strong sensual excitement and the domain of relationships that
it leads her into. As she satisﬁes this sensual excitement with changing
and arbitrary people this may seem to expose her to the phenomenon of
contingency. However, the end of such affairs comes about either through
some “natural” detachment—“given her temperament, she had hitherto never
lost her lovers except as one mislays something and forgets if attracted to
something new”—or with a suddenness that allows her to understand it as
the operation of some higher power.23 The delicate balance between the
two spheres that constitute her life is, however, destabilized by Ulrich’s
“quiet resistance.” For the ﬁrst time Bonadea feels abandoned, a feeling
that had previously been prevented by the way in which her affairs had
ended and by the stability of her family life. As a reaction, Bonadea tries
to ﬁnd a more secure balance between the two spheres of her life—by
making Ulrich her permanent lover and thus by binding also the second
sphere to one permanent individual.
Arnheim is probably the ﬁgure least affected by the problem of con-
tingency in the novel, and thus a natural opposite to Ulrich. While Ulrich
has a sense of possible realities, Arnheim has a sense of real possibilities,
which bring with them a certain necessity—it is necessary that a certain
reality should contain this set of possibilities and no others (otherwise it would
be a different reality).24 Thanks to his family and personal gifts Arnheim
holds an extraordinary position within society and possesses a strong
sense of his own self, which for him grounds his thinking and acting.
Two further characteristics allow him to avoid any real experience of
contingency: the fact that he is well read in many different ﬁelds and can
relate them to each other allows him to see such different realms as
economy, the arts, politics, mysticism, etc. as intimately connected and
thus as a meaningful whole.25 And whatever he cannot grasp, he devalues
as unimportant.26 It is no surprise that he takes Goethe as a paradigm for
himself, the well-rounded universalist for whom freedom is not tied to
radical contingency but to autonomy.
His tendency to give all his actions generality (which allows him to
avoid the contingency an individual action may possess) seems to come
in conﬂict with the love he develops for Diotima, which may be perceived
as “betraying a cause for a personal weakness” (chapter 105). However,
as their love is understood by both as a meeting of minds, it also can be
seen as presenting some necessity for Arnheim.
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Diotima and Walter are less immune to the phenomena of contin-
gency and so feel some unease about it. In contrast to Ulrich, Diotima
understands her own life as a necessary unfolding or ascent, as continu-
ously climbing up a stairway.27 However, once involved in the Parallel
Campaign, she realizes that the great ideas that seem to be the basic prin-
ciples of states, societies, and everything she thinks of as good and right
do not seem to stand in any intelligible relationship to each other; they
present her suddenly with many “eternal truths” that even contradict each
other. And there is no single idea capable of grounding all the others. Both
Diotima as well as Walter blame the current times as the reason for the
lack of necessity they experience in the world.28
Clarisse, ﬁnally, who often seems at the brink of madness, at times
possesses the same impersonal relationship to herself as Ulrich.29 Like
Ulrich, she does not believe in any of the necessities that society claims;
she draws connections nobody else does, and she asks for more consis-
tency in our actions.30 While she does not herself understand the implications
of such an impersonal notion of the self, she eagerly takes up Ulrich’s sug-
gestions, and tries to push his ideas further, as when she demands that
Ulrich should free Moosbrugger, or that the Parallel Campaign should be
devoted to a Nietzsche or Ulrich year.
The way she grounds her life and gives it meaning is by attaching
herself to some other human being of great importance: ﬁrst to Walter, in
whose genius she originally believes, and, after it has turned out that
Walter will not produce anything of real genius, to Ulrich, whom she takes
to be a kind of redeemer, a devil or a god.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have tried to give an account of Musil’s treatment of the problem of
contingency, of his discussion of different ways in which individual
people as well as a whole state attempt to deal with contingency. The
ﬁgure of Ulrich allows Musil to radicalize the problem by showing what
happens if the problem of contingency is transferred even to the relation-
ship one has to one’s own self—the ultimate outcome of which leads to
self-alienation. If this radical contingency is not softened in any way, as
we see it at times being the case with Ulrich, then it will lead either (1) to
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the impossibility of any action, or (2) to what from the outside looks
simply like acting according to the dominant conventions, or (3) to arbi-
trary actions for which no reason can be given.
The alternative is that the radical contingency is weakened by ﬁnding
some form of grounding or necessity. This can be done either (1) by tying
individual acts back to a basic principle, or (2) by seeing some necessity
in the connection of the different individual contingent acts; or (3) by
seeing some necessity at a general level, even if at the individual level it
is arbitrary who or what exactly ﬁlls out this general structure.
Finally, with the relationship of Ulrich and Agathe, Musil also puts
forward the possibility of some natural necessity, which seems to have no
place in our modern times any more.
Part of Musil’s insight with regard to the problem of contingency
seems to be that the question how individuals are to make sense of their
actions or their lives in such a way as does not prevent them from acting
is best discussed in a novel, since discussing it in general philosophical
terms necessarily abstracts from the individuality of the circumstances
and persons. Whether we can indeed integrate this individuality into a
meaningful basis for our actions is, however, exactly what the problem of
contingency poses as a challenge.31
Barbara Sattler
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NOTES
1. If we capture modality in terms of possible worlds, then what is (logically or meta-
physically) necessary is what is true in all possible worlds; what is contingent is true in
some but not all possible worlds; and what is impossible is what is false in all possible
worlds. What is contingent can not only be seen as the opposite to what is necessary (□ p),
but also as the opposite to what is impossible (□ ¬ p); cf., for example, the article “Kon-
tingenz” in: J. Ritter, K. Gründer and G. Gabriel, eds., Historisches Wörterbuch der
Philosophie, Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 1971–2007. I will not deal with this other opposition,
impossibility, here, since this opposition is less important for the problem of human
agency.
2. These different spheres do not always ﬁt exactly the division into different kinds of
necessity which we ﬁnd in contemporary debates. Especially the division between epis-
temic and metaphysical necessity is not one that can always clearly be drawn in the novel.
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What is important in the novel is the “perceived metaphysical necessity,” not metaphysi-
cal necessity per se.
3. Cf. Ulrich‘s comparison between natural laws and statistical regularities, The Man
Without Qualities (MWQ), trans. Sophie Wilkins and Burton Pike, London: Picador 1995,
chapter 103. All further references are to this edition.
4. “When Bonadea studied her appearance in a new dress in her mirror, she could
never have imagined a time to come when leg-of-mutton sleeves, little curls framing the
forehead, and long bell-shaped skirts would be replaced by knee-length skirts and hair cut
like a boy’s. Nor would she have argued against it; her brain was simply incapable of
imagining such a possibility.” MWQ, chapter 109, 572.
5. 11–12, my italics.
6. Cf. the beginning of the quotation above.
7. It can, for example, be found in Ulrich’s reﬂections about the “law of large
numbers,” see chapter 103, 532.
8. Cf. Musil’s account of a world of qualities without man in chapter 39, and Ulrich’s
relationship to women as characterized below.
9. This principle could be some telos, which is what the members of the Parallel Cam-
paign are looking for, or divine predestination, as Count Leinsdorf wants to claim for his
self-understanding as an aristocrat.
10. “There are so many inexplicable things in life, but one loses sight of them when
singing the national anthem.” Chapter 109, 577.
11. As can be seen, for example, with the proto-fascist group around Hans Sepp.
12. Cf. chapter 108.
13. Thus a “bureaucratic necessity” is all that is left.
14. Chapter 57, 246.
15. Cf. chapter 114; against the conventional morality Ulrich attempts to come up with
a moral system that possesses more internal consistency.
16. Chapter 5, 16.
17. Chapter 40, 169.
18. Cf. chapter 39, 157.
19. Since love is a feeling that is often involved in our attempts to give our life
meaning, it seems to be a particularly interesting ﬁeld for studying the effects that aware-
ness of contingency can have on it.
20. Ulrich’s relationship to Gerda, Clarissa, and Diotima are also erotically coloured;
however, since they are not his girlfriends, no mechanism of compensation does seem to
be necessary.
21. Cf. also Ulrich’s renaming of his cousin as Diotima.
22. This is also expressed by the fact that right at the beginning, when they ﬁrst meet
again after many years, both have independently decided to wear some clown pajamas.
23. Chapter 33, 133.
24. Thus for Arnheim nothing that is not rational ever happens in world history. For him
the fact that the ﬁrst session of the great patriotic campaign could take place shows already
its “profound necessity” (chapter 43).
25. Cf. chapter 44: “the world was in order as soon as Arnheim had given it his due con-
sideration,” and also chapter 48 and 86.
26. Cf. chapter 86.
27. Chapter 69, 313.
28. Cf. chapters 17 and 24.
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29. Cf. chapter 82.
30. Book II, chapter 7. And, like Ulrich, Clarisse is convinced to play some important
role in life, cf. chapters 38 and 97.
31. I would like to thank Justine Broackes, Michael della Rocca, and Wolfgang Sattler
for their comments on this paper. A ﬁrst version proﬁted very much from Ulrich Bergmann’s
criticism and encouragement.
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